INTRODUCTION
South Sudan fits a dominant narrative: of state predation, fragmentation, and collapse; and of the resilience of its people, whose ability to suffer predation and to survive is relied on by both the old Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) elites, as they asset strip accelerating economic breakdown has fundamentally undermined the personalised financial systems that kept armed soldiers paid and maintained local markets and rents in Juba's suburbs, and has escalated terrifying rates of violent crime. Army uniforms and guns are for hire. 2 Juba's residents are suffering from exhaustion, fear, and the inability to find restitution for the vast majority of crimes. During research in late 2015, a church group conducted group prayers for safety and justice at the site of a horrific gang rape, and an old woman in another suburb explained how she now carries a foot-long crucifix as personal spiritual protection since the massacres in December 2013 (E. V., 2015 int.). Where national news reports blame violent crime on 'unknown gunmen', Juba residents wryly refer to 'known gunmen,' or 'unknown government.'
If, as Mahmood Mamdani (2016) recently argued, there is now 'no bureaucracy, no judiciary, nothing to fail', how is Juba governing itself in the everyday as formal structures collapse?
As several residents noted in 2015 and 2016 (ints.) For locals, these authorities -who determine rights to residence, disputes over land and marriage, domestic violence cases, abuses by soldiers, disputes over water point access, and organise polio vaccinations, tax markets, and manage rubbish dump sites -are only really plural in the sense that there are a lot of them across Juba's roughly forty square miles; their multiple connections and interests across institutional, private business, and military-security 5 sectors are entirely normal and congruent in this context. This study thus sets Juba's 'state' actors into a wider field of 'plural, hybrid, public authorities' in the city. It follows Lund (2016 Lund ( , 2006 and Boone (2018 Boone ( , 2014 in explicitly linking land, politics, and authority, and specifically takes up the historical and geographical turn in research on public authority in the last few years. The majority of Juba's judicialadministrative public authorities have grown from negotiations over residential space in Juba's rapidly-expanded suburbs during post-war reconstruction from around 2006 onwards.
As the (late, disputed) Bari Paramount Chief Dennis Faragalla (2016 int.) noted, 'the genesis of all of these problems is the issue of control of land. ' Badiey's (2014) This historical geography of local authority illustrates how these institutions have negotiated their powers and abilities to arbitrate spaces and communities, the groundings of their logics and codes, and their sources of legitimacy.
Exploring the history of these local powers, logics, and legitimacies -how, on a small scale, these institutions have established themselves, and have been established, as authorities within a community -develops, and challenges, a current dominant political analysis of the nature of power in South Sudan today. This analysis sees South Sudan's elites as competitors in a 'political marketplace', building their power on systems of patronage and nepotism rooted in systemic acquisition of resources (de Waal 2014) . These elites, in this analysis, selectively invest these resources in gift-giving, marriage and kinship networks (Pinaud 2014: 192) , making themselves a 'military aristocracy' (Pinaud 2014 (Pinaud , 2016 governing, as Stringham and Forney put it (2017: 178) , 'hordes of "tribal" clients, loyal proxies for whom '"tribalism" masks class privilege', binding this 'lower stratum of followers' (Pinaud 2014: 195) (Leonardi 2011: 232) . But -crucially -once these new suburbs are established, these same militarised authorities continue to be involved in the management of these neighbourhoods within which their garrisons, government offices, businesses, and families are often located, using more than just the threat or use of force, or demands of base rents and reciprocities. This involves, as Stringham and Forney (2017: 179) 'new nation' (or at very least a 'new state'). New laws drafted after the end of the second civil war, under the interim regional administration, set out a hierarchy of legal and statutory authority from the high court to 'customary' chiefs' courts at county and sub-county levels that echoed a prospective administrative system for service delivery (Leonardi et al. 2010) .
Juba was at the heart of this state-, government-, and law-building project, hosting the high court and court of appeal, national and Central Equatoria State ministries, police training centres, and local government offices. Despite extensive under-staffing and under-skilling, these offices contained individuals with significant expertise and personal commitment to making things work, based often on personal administrative and legal experience from previous Sudan government work, and/or employment within local civil-military administrations of the SPLM/A. In practice, these 'new' institutions only somewhat reworked old expertise, laws, practice and paperwork. The most significant aspects of this institution-9 building process were mostly focused in Juba, mainly the salaries and training opportunities.
But these state systems' reach was extremely limited, even within Juba, and under significant stress even before the economic crisis and political collapse over 2013 (see Badiey 2014) .
The violence in the city in December 2013 stripped away the finances, salaries, and the apparently distinct roles of security, police, military and legal system workers, and escalated abuses of power and contempt for these laws, particularly among military-security actors, 
The geography of authority in Juba
Over 2006 to 2011, Juba was likely the fastest-growing city in the world. As internally displaced families, refugees, jobseekers and workers in massive new state-building and developmental projects flowed into the city, the town grew from around 250,000 to an estimated million residents by 2011. 3 Formal processes for land allocation were overtaken by But this was, and is, not a one-way process of predation: these elites were involved in shaping and managing suburban communities not only for gross self-aggrandisement but also because they often lived within these areas, or had family and kin involved and invested within these new neighbourhoods. For many military commanders and other powerful figures, managing the inevitable growth of suburbs containing significant numbers of military families was and is a vital and civic necessity for maintaining public order and authority. These neighbourhoods are thus partly outside of the town's state structure, knowledge, and civic/civil authority. 5 This day-to-day authority instead rests with the people who have organised and arbitrated these new neighbourhoods; and so the recent history of how these various local elites managed this rapid expansion -their knowledge of the varied legal and social topography of Juba's suburbs, including its garrisons and multiple avenues for petitioning for funds and services -is at the root of their authority and their continued abilities to arbitrate and manage these spaces. Legitimate authority is defined in this context as whoever has the proven knowledge, connections, and relationships that are necessary to mediate disputes between neighbours, whose claims to legitimate residence are based on both this recent history of neighbourhood creation, and the various common law determinants of neighbourhood plot rights.
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Gurrei and Gumbo
This We erected a police and youth office, and formed community policing at night to patrol the area. [We] had been requesting the police to be brought to his area, but they [said] that they lack the personnel.
That is why the youth and community are trying their best at least to patrol at night, and that reduces the crime at night.
Municipal or state services are broadly absent across these new suburbs, generally present only as individual police stations (for instance at Gurrei in Godele) or as one of many unpredictable and unaccountable tax collectors in neighbourhood markets. In practice, these suburbs' local authorities derive their legitimacy from doing what local government is supposed to do, in funding clinics, convening community meetings, lobbying NGOs to provide services such as boreholes, collecting donations for youth and women's association offices, and organising 'community policing' patrols. These self-government processes, networks and skills were developed during the war, and have been employed in Juba by the city's new, mostly ex-refugee and ex-displaced residents regardless of the peace declaration and establishment of a new nation-state.
These local justice systems, in making service provisions central to their role and legitimacy, reflect the common understanding of justice and security in Juba. In the current economic collapse, arbitrating access to resources is key to maintaining social order and preventing violence and criminality. As Justine, a female Nuer court member in Gumbo said, 'we are so poor we can't describe it': for her, the rule of law depended on maintaining order at the water pump queue, and arbitrating over a general lack of saucepans and cooking equipment among court resolved a domestic violence and divorce case by granting the divorce to the injured wife of a serving police officer, and organising with his commanding office for child support payments to be taken from his salary; a family member of the court working in the police station is overseeing this. These authorities enforce their decisions through the threat of imprisonment or physical punishment from state or community police, but also through social pressure and public shaming. Their determinations are not necessarily reflective of international or national laws, and made more often on the basis of social stability and collective security, rather than fairness; for the courts I spoke to for this study, their priority is to minimise risks of issues escalating, including by arbitrating accidental road deaths and teenage pregnancies through compensatory processes (2015 ints.).
Despite increasing numbers of female representatives across Juba, these courts are still patriarchal, punitive, and militarised. This is hardly surprising. As Lemay-Hébert and 
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The work of these local authorities work sets out a practical understanding of how to govern South Sudan: using basic ethno-regional categories to structure court representation (as Nuer, Pari, Chollo, or Kakwa, for instance) but also negotiating and understanding complex multiand inter-ethnic familial and social disputes, using ethnic heritages as the structuring moral codes and ethical authority to demand social responsibility, respect, and adherence to court decisions. This is not just a system of base 'ethnic' loyalties and deference to elite military patrons, a picture implied by a top-down approach to South Sudan's 'political marketplace', but a social and moral balancing act that requires societal and cultural expertise, as well as the ability to draw down coercive power. Most people explained that they approached these court systems not necessarily hoping for justice -which in most cases, because of the difficulty in tracing, arresting and prosecuting suspects for anything from petty theft to rape, is often unlikely -but for practicable solutions that would be fair enough in the medium term.
These local court committees' legitimacy and authority is built on their ability to manage this, and to provide some kind of neighbourhood stability and predictability within which families can plan at least an interim future.
As such, as well as building up a historical and geographical understanding of public authority in Juba, this article emphasises the temporality of these authorities. As paramount chief Daramallo summarised (2016 int.):
In theory, no tribe can make a court in the area of another tribe. Chiefs have proliferated with urbanisation; the legitimate ones are in the village. The urban ones are pseudo-chiefs… Are these courts to be temporarily recognised? And how do we cater for these justice matters without changing the existing system?
Operating in this questionable space, these Juba authorities are making and protecting space and community for a certain value of protection, community, and rights to residence, for a limited but useful time. Their parameters, rules, and organisation are constantly shifting across the city's suburbs, but their authority is in part derived from being able to make decisions that stick, not for some entirely unfeasible 'permanent' future, but for the time being. This temporality makes their decisions possibly more legitimate -because they implicitly recognise the instability and possible impermanence of both claims and lives in Juba, and unpredictable collective futures. Decisions made (including rights to residence, marriage settlements, custody, and other disputes) are settled on the most practicable balance of the interests of individuals, families, and safety. These compromises are part of a long history of temporary arbitration and authority, particularly for migrant and urban residents, who have worked with promissory notes and marriage settlements based on future prospects throughout the last civil war. From the perspective of this local history, many of South Sudan's ideas of governance and legal administration have been generated through this process of order for now, and judgements for the time being.
